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INTRODUCTION
During a trial,.a witness's job is to supply the facts by telling the jury
what she saw, heard, or otherwise experienced that is relevant to the legal
questions the jury must answer.' The jury'sjob is to decide how much weight
and credibility to accord a witness's testimony.
2 Jurors are expected, even
instructed,3 to rely on their own knowledge about the world when deciding
whether and how much to believe a witness.
4 Most of the time, jurors' own
experiences are sufficient to allow them to accurately assess a witness's 
tes-
timony.s However, jurors are sometimes called upon to assess testimony that
their own experiences have not prepared them to assess accurately.
6 In these
cases, expert witnesses can provide jurors with the knowledge that they need
to evaluate the evidence properly.
7 By definition, an expert witness is some-
' Blackburn v. Murphy, 737 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tenn. 1987) (stating that "it is the function
of the witness to state evidentiary facts and the function of the jury to draw such conclusions
as the facts warrant") (alteration and citation omitted); State v. Smith, 30 La. Ann. 457, 458
(1878) ("It was the province of the witness to state facts, and of the jury to draw inferences,
opinions, and conclusions from those facts."). Cf MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY
EC 5-9 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1980) ("The roles of an advocate and of a witness are inconsistent;
the function of an advocate is to advance or argue the cause of another, while that of a
witness is to state facts objectively.").
2 See 1 LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., 1 MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL ¶
7.01 Witness Credibility (2017), available at LEXIS ("[Y]ou should look at all of the evi-
dence in deciding what credence and what weight, if any, you will want to give to the ...
witnesses.").
I See id. at T 5.02 Testimony, Exhibits, Stipulations, and Judicial Notice ("You should con-
sider the evidence in light of your own common sense and experience, and you may draw
reasonable inferences from the evidence."); United States v. Cruz-Valdez, 773 F.2d 1541,
1546 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) ("[J]urors are correctly instructed to use their common sense
and to evaluate the facts in light of their common knowledge of the natural tendencies and
inclinations of human beings.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
4 See Cruz- Valdez, 773 F.2d at 1546.
5 SAND ET AL., supra note 2, at T 7.01 Witness Credibility cmt. ("Use your common sense
and your everyday experience in dealing with other people. And then decide what testimony
you believe.").
6 See Young v. Dep't of Transp., 744 A.2d 1276, 1278 (Pa. 2000) ("Expert testimony is
often employed to help jurors understand issues and evidence which is outside of the aver-
age juror's normal realm of experience.").
See id. As the Supreme Court of Missouri explained in 1896:
The witnesses, as a general rule, must state facts, from which the jurors
are to form their opinion. But when the facts are all stated, upon a subject
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one who has knowledge that would be helpful to jurors-helpful both be-
cause jurors are unlikely to have this knowledge and because this knowledge
is important to properly understanding something at issue in the case.'
Cases involving claims of serious mental illness are one kind of case
that jurors might not be able to evaluate properly without input from expert
witnesses.' People with serious mental illnesses often experience things that
a juror, unless he has had these same experiences, is likely to find unbeliev-
able. For example, Eric Clark believed that aliens had taken over the bodies
of people in his town,10 and Russell Weston believed that the key to prevent-
ing a worldwide deadly plague was hidden inside a safe in the U.S. Capitol
building.I' If called upon to assess a claim of insanity in these cases, jurors
of inquiry, if an intelligent opinion cannot be drawn therefrom by inexpe-
rienced persons, such as constitute the ordinary jury, an exception is made
to the general rule, and persons who, by experience, observation, or
knowledge, are peculiarly qualified to draw conclusions from such facts,
are, for the purpose of aiding the jury, permitted to give their opinion. The
exception is allowed from necessity.
Benjamin v. Metro. St. Ry. Co., 34 S.W. 590, 593 (Mo. 1896).
8 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, expert testimony is admissible only if it will "help"
the trier of fact. See FED. R. EVID. 702(a) cmt. (stating that an expert witness's opinion is
allowed only if the expert's specialized knowledge "will help the trier offact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue" (emphasis added)). If an expert proposes to
offer testimony that is not beyond jurors' own knowledge, then the testimony is not helpful
and therefore inadmissible. See Nichols v. Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 154 F.3d 875, 883 (8th Cir.
1998) (stating expert testimony "is not helpful if it draws inferences or reaches conclusions
within the jury's competence").
9 See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 80-81 (1985) ("[P]sychiatrists ideally assist lay jurors,
who generally have no training in psychiatric matters, to make a sensible and educated de-
termination about the mental condition of the defendant at the time of the offense."). As the
Georgia Court of Appeals explained:
[T]he State was required to show that Porter had knowledge of her hus-
band's actions . . . It was for the jury to decide whether Porter had the
requisite knowledge, but it was important that their decision be made upon
all the facts. If, indeed, Porter suffered from a psychological condition
that caused her not to become aware of painful facts, the only way the jury
could know about such a condition was through expert testimony. Psy-
chological diagnosis was not within the jury's ken. Once armed with this
testimony, they could choose to believe it or not in concluding whether
Porter had the requisite knowledge, and they could then fairly decide her
fate.
Porter v. State, 532 S.E.2d 407, 416 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
* Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 735 (2006).
"United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 19-20 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Tatel, J., concurring).
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who have not experienced psychotic symptoms, or who have not interacted
with someone who is experiencing such symptoms, might well conclude that
a defendant simply made up these beliefs after having committed a crime to
support a defense of insanity.'
2 An expert witness can provide the jurors with
the knowledge necessary to accurately assess these beliefs. For example, the
expert witness can explain that delusions, which are beliefs not based 
in re-
ality,13 are in fact a common symptom of illnesses such as schizophrenia 
and
bipolar disorder.1 4 This knowledge can help the jury to not automatically
dismiss the defendant's reported delusions as too bizarre or too convenient
to possibly be real.
Expert witnesses can supplement jurors' knowledge of serious men-
tal illnesses, but what about supplementing people's knowledge beyond the
narrow trial context? For example, misconceptions about serious mental ill-
nesses cause people to hold erroneous beliefs about the insanity defense, and
these erroneous beliefs can influence, not just the outcome of a single trial,
but the availability of the defense in general.
15 How can the public be in-
formed about serious mental illnesses so that these erroneous beliefs can be
corrected?
This article proposes that memoirs of mental illness can serve as a
kind of expert witness for the public. One reason why people distrust crimi-
nal defendants' claims of serious mental illness is that criminal defendants
have obvious motives to lie.' 6 Additionally, because the immediate conse-
12 See infra Part I.B (discussing widespread belief that people fake insanity).
13 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 87 (5th ed. 2013).
14 Id. at 87, 152.
15 Although this article focuses on the insanity defense, the same misconceptions about se-
rious mental illnesses may affect other aspects of the legal system where mental illness is
relevant, such as competency to stand trial and competency to be executed. See, e.g., Chris-
topher Seeds, The Afterlife of Ford and Panetti: Execution Competence and the Capacity to
Assist Counsel, 53 ST. Louis U. L. J. 309, n.129 (2009) ("The Court's opinion in Panetti
responds to the fear, held by many, that death row prisoners fake insanity to avoid execution.
The validity of such claims is questionable. But concerns persist, as evidenced in Justice
Thomas's dissent in Panetti, which reiterates those expressed twenty years before.") (em-
phasis added) (citation omitted).
16 See infra Part I.B (discussing widespread belief that people fake insanity).
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quence of being found not guilty by reason of insanity is indefinite civil com-
mitment,'7 the insanity defense is typically reserved for cases in which the
defendant has been charged with a very serious offense,18 which means that
someone asserting an insanity defense usually has a very strong motive to
lie. But thousands of people experience the very same kinds of symptoms
when there is no obvious motive to report fictitious psychotic symptoms and
when there are obvious disincentives, such as civil commitment and forced
medication, to admitting such psychotic symptoms.19 Reading the memoirs
of people who have themselves experienced these symptoms may help dispel
the suspicion that someone claiming to hold beliefs that are demonstrably
false must be lying.2 0
" See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983) ("The committed acquittee is entitled
to release when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous.").
8 Kent Greenawalt, "Uncontrollable" Actions and the Eighth Amendment: Implications of
Powell v. Texas, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 927, 961 (1969) ("Since a finding of not guilty by
reason of insanity is likely to result in indefinite civil commitment, the defense is usually
raised only for the most serious crimes, particularly murder."); David B. Wexler, Incompe-
tency, Insanity, and Involuntary Civil Commitment, in MENTAL HEALTH AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 139, 153 (L. Teplin ed., 1984) ("[I]f successful invocation of the insanity defense
can lead automatically to a period of confinement longer than a criminal sentence, then
criminal defendants charged with any but the most serious of offenses will generally choose
not to assert the defense . . . and will therefore probably not be treated at all.").
" Cf Mental Health by the Numbers, NATIONAL ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS,
https://www.nami.org/learn-more/mental-health-by-the-numbers (last visited March 5,
2019) (stating that one in twenty-five adults, 9.8 million, have a serious mental illness that
substantially interferes with life).
20 Prosecutors often offer expert testimony for a similar reason in cases in which an abused
child has changed her account of abuse or behaved in some other way that a juror might
interpret as a sign of untruthfulness. Cf 1 JOHN E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT CASES § 5.49 at 561-63 (3d ed. 1997). Prosecutors often offer expert testi-
mony for a similar reason in cases in which an abused child has changed her account of
abuse or behaved in some other way that a juror might interpret as a sign of untruthfulness.
As one scholar reports:
Courts permit expert testimony to explain why sexually abused children
delay reporting abuse, why children recant, why children's descriptions
of abuse are sometimes inconsistent, why some abused children are angry,
why some children want to live with the person who abused them, why a
victim might appear "emotionally flat" following the assault, why a child
might run away from home ....
Id; see also State v. R.B., 873 A.2d 511, 520 (N.J. 2005) (citations omitted) (allowing ex-
pert testimony regarding Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome because "it helps
to dispel preconceived, but not necessarily valid, conceptions jurors may have concerning
the likelihood of the child's truthfulness as a result of her delay in having disclosed the abuse
or sought help."); People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131, 136 (N.Y. 1990) ("Because cultural
2019]
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Of course, a person writing a memoir might also have a motive to lie.
For example, James Frey infamously confessed to fabricating much of his
best-selling 2003 book, A Million Little Pieces, which was originally mar-
keted as a non-fiction account of his drug addiction.
2 1 On the other hand,
while no memoirist likely presents an account that is completely accurate in
all of the details,22 the consistency that emerges across numerous writers
about their experiences of serious mental illness provides one means of es-
tablishing the accuracy of these memoirs. Frey's book was compelling in
part because it was very different from other memoirs of addiction.
23 Con-
versely, most memoirs of mental illness are useful precisely because they
present very similar accounts of the experience of psychotic symptoms. 
For
example, although the specific content of delusional beliefs may vary,
24 what
myths still affect common understanding of rape and rape victims and because 
experts have
been studying the effects of rape upon its victims only since the 1970's, we believe that
patterns of response among rape victims are not within the ordinary 
understanding of the
lay juror. For that reason, we conclude that introduction of expert testimony describing rape
trauma syndrome may under certain circumstances assist a lay jury in deciding issues in a
rape trial.").
21 See Samantha J. Katze, A Million Little Maybes: The James Frey Scandal and Statements
on a Book Cover or Jacket as Commercial Speech, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 207, 213-15 (2006). Frey was sued by readers who claimed that they were fraud-
ulently induced to purchase the book. In re "A Million Little Pieces" Litigation, 435 F.
Supp. 2d 1336 (J.P.M.L. 2006) (consolidation order).
22 Cf Paul Guajardo & David W. Read, Sin Documentos: Legally Instructive 
Narratives in
Mexican-American Memoirs and United States Immigration Law, 24 TEX. HISP. J. L. &
POL'Y 1, 14-15 (2017) ("Certainly, memory is sometimes faulty, and of course, readers
need to be aware of possible posturing, exaggerations, and biases in texts, but these caveats
apply to any literature.").
23 For example, Frey rejects the surrendering to a higher power approach of Alcoholics
Anonymous. See Laura Miller, The Thirteenth Step Books, NEW YORKER, May 12, 2003, 
at
110 ("But Frey's most attention-grabbing move is his utter rejection of the Twelve Step
approach.").
24 There are some consistent hemes to delusions. The DSM identifies five primary catego-
ries of delusions:
1. Erotomanic type: This subtype applies when the central theme of the
delusion is that another person is in love with the individual.
2. Grandiose type: This subtype applies when the central theme of the
delusion is the conviction of having some great (but unrecognized) talent
or insight or having made some important discovery.
3. Jealous type: This subtype applies when the central theme of the indi-
vidual's delusion is that his or her spouse or lover is unfaithful.
4. Persecutory type: This subtype applies when the central theme of the
delusion involves the individual's belief that he or she is being conspired
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is similar is that: (1) these beliefs are almost certainly are not true; and (2)
the person holding these beliefs really does believe them to be true.25 Addi-
tionally, decades of scientific research have documented the experience of
psychotic symptoms.26 Memoirs are instructive because they provide con-
crete examples of psychotic symptoms, not because they provide the sole
evidence of these symptoms.27
The aim of this article is to demonstrate how memoirs can increase
public understanding of legal issues relating to the experience of serious
mental illnesses. Part I of this article discusses the insanity defense, includ-
ing the widespread distrust of claims of insanity. Part II examines several
issues relating to civil commitment and involuntary treatment. Although less
publicly visible than the insanity defense, the issues of civil commitment and
involuntary medication have far greater practical importance in the lives of
people who are seriously mentally ill. Additionally, deep divisions exist
among both patients and treatment providers regarding when, if ever, these
against, cheated, spied on, followed, poisoned or drugged, maliciously
maligned, harassed, or obstructed in the pursuit of long-term goals.
5. Somatic type: This subtype applies when the central theme of the delu-
sion involves bodily functions or sensations
AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
90-92 (5th ed. 2013).
25 Id. at 92.
26 See generally Susanna L. Blumenthal, The Deviance of the Will: Policing the Bounds of
Testamentary Freedom in Nineteenth-Century America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 959 (2006) (dis-
cussing the tension between scientific and legal definitions of delusions beginning in the
1800s); see also Joshua C. Tate, Personal Reality: Delusion in Law and Science, 49 CONN.
L. REv. 891, 897 (2017) ("The doctrine of insane delusion entered the common law in the
nineteenth century as an embrace of a concept that was, at the time, cutting-edge science.").
27 For this reason, the use of memoirs or "stories" to illustrate psychotic symptoms avoids
the problems associated with the use of stories in some other contexts. See, e.g., Daniel A.
Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards ofDimitri Yurasov: Further Reflections on
Scholarship and Truth, 46 STAN L. REv. 647, 652 (1994) ("Our own view is that stories are
significant only when they are shown to be typical."); Stephan Landsman, The Crime of
Sheila Mcgough. by Janet Malcolm. New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1999. Pp. 161. $22., 98
MICH. L. REv. 2154, 2167 (2000) ("A single idiosyncratic anecdote is not proof of any-
thing."); William M. Richman, Evolved into Firms, 80 IOWA L. REv. 419, 430 n.23 (1995)
("If a story, though true, is not typical-i.e., representative of many other stories that could
be told-then it cannot support generalizations, theorizing, or concrete law reform pro-
posals.").
2019]
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measures are appropriate. 28 Part III discusses what can be learned from men-
tal illness memoirs, focusing on the ways that memoirs can serve an expert
witness function by increasing understanding of serious mental illnesses.
Specifically, this part demonstrates how a greater understanding of 
psychosis
can change misperceptions about the insanity defense and inform debates
about civil commitment and involuntary treatment.
1. THE INSANITY DEFENSE
A. A Brief Overview
Among various jurisdictions in the United States, current definitions
of "insanity" vary greatly.29 Some states follow the "M'Naughten test,"
named for the historically important case of Daniel M'Naughten, who at-
tempted to kill the British Prime Minister and did kill the Prime Minister's
secretary because M'Naughten believed that the Prime Minister was plan-
ning to kill him.3 0 In considering this case, the House of Lords stated 
that a
defendant would be not guilty by reason of insanity if:
28 See John Monahan, A Jurisprudence ofRisk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Pris-
oners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REv. 391, 401 (2006) ("Mandating adherence 
to
mental health treatment in the community through outpatient commitment has now become
the most contested issue in mental health law.").
29 According to the Supreme Court:
Seventeen States and the Federal Government have adopted a recogniza-
ble version of the M'Naghten test with both its cognitive incapacity and
moral incapacity components. One State has adopted only M'Naghten 's
cognitive incapacity test, and 10 (including Arizona) have adopted the
moral incapacity test alone. Fourteen jurisdictions, inspired by the Model
Penal Code, have in place an amalgam of the volitional incapacity test and
some variant of the moral incapacity test, satisfaction of either (generally
by showing a defendant's substantial lack of capacity) being enough to
excuse. Three States combine a full M'Naghten test with a volitional in-
capacity formula. And New Hampshire alone stands by the product-of-
mental-illness test. The alternatives are multiplied further by variations in
the prescribed insanity verdict: a significant number of these jurisdictions
supplement the traditional "not guilty by reason of insanity verdict" with
an alternative of "guilty but mentally ill." Finally, four States have no af-
firmative insanity defense, though one provides for a 'guilty and mentally
ill' verdict.
Clark, 548 U.S. at 750-52 (footnotes omitted).
30 Jennifer S. Bard, Re-Arranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: Why the Incarceration of
Individuals with Serious Mental Illness Violates Public Health, Ethical, and Constitutional
140
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[A]t the time of the committing the act, the party accused was
laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing
what was wrong.31
Many states currently define insanity in terms of one or both parts of
the M'Naughten test.3 2 The Model Penal Code recommends a version of
M'Naughten that substitutes "lacks substantial capacity" for complete lack
of capacity:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time
of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law.33
Other influential insanity tests include the "irresistible-impulse test"
and the "product test."3 4
Although the precise, technical differences among the various tests
of insanity can be philosophically interesting, it is unclear whether these dif-
ferences have a meaningful effect on a defendant's likelihood of being found
not guilty by reason of insanity.35 Some research suggests that jurors regard
Principles and Therefore Cannot Be Made Right by Piecemeal Changes to the Insanity De-
fense, 5 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 31 (2005).
1 Id. at 33.
32 Clark, 548 U.S. at 750-52.
33 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985).
34 See Clark, 548 U.S. at 749-5 1. As the Court explained:
The volitional incapacity or irresistible-impulse test, which surfaced over
two centuries ago (first in England, then in this country), asks whether a
person was so lacking in volition due to a mental defect or illness that he
could not have controlled his actions. And the product-of-mental-illness
test was used as early as 1870, and simply asks whether a person's action
was a product of a mental disease or defect.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
" According to one scholar:
2019]
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any insanity test as essentially a test of fitness for moral (and legal) respon-
sibility.3 6 At least one scholar has proposed a test that would define insanity
not in terms of any specific cognitive or volitional deficiency, but instead, in
terms of moral fitness for criminal condemnation.
37
B. Distrust of Claims ofInsanity
In at least some areas of law, cultural preconceptions not only influence
the application of legal standards, they may supplant them altogether.
This phenomenon has been documented by researchers who, after study-
ing the impact of different insanity tests on jury decision making, have
consistently concluded that the actual legal formulations do not make
much of a difference. Jurors tend to decide cases consistently regardless
of the specific legal standards that supposedly govern their decision mak-
ng.
Russell D. Covey, Criminal Madness: Cultural Iconography and Insanity, 61 STAN. L. REv.
1375, 1380 (2009) (footnote omitted). See also John Q. La Fond & Mary L. Durham, Cog-
nitive Dissonance: Have Insanity Defense and Civil Commitment Reforms Made A Differ-
ence?, 39 VILL. L. REV. 71, 91 (1994) ("For many years, legal scholars and psychiatrists
have debated the strengths and weaknesses of various insanity defense formulations. Much
of the debate has focused on the theoretical implications of specific formulations for con-
viction or acquittal. Ironically, this debate has virtually ignored whether different insanity
tests make a practical difference."). But see Christopher Slobogin, The Guilty but Mentally
Ill Verdict: An Idea Whose Time Should Not Have Come, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 494, 522
(1985).
36 See Joshua Dressler, Some Very Modest Reflections on Excusing Criminal Wrongdoers,
42 TEX. TECH L. REv. 247, 257 (2009); Amanda C. Pustilnik, Prisons of the Mind: Social
Value and Economic Inefficiency in the Criminal Justice Response to Mental Illness, 96 J.
OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 217, 247 (2005) ("Actual insanity defense trials, though rare,
also demonstrate that jurors equate imposing liability on people with concededly severe
mental illnesses with supporting the norm of individual responsibility.").
* Professor Stephen Morse, a leading scholar on the insanity defense, has proposed:
Although a workable, restricted test similar to present tests can be con-
structed, I would like to suggest a new alternative: A defendant is not
guilty by reason of insanity if, at the time of the offense, the defendant
was so extremely crazy and the craziness so substantially affected the
criminal behavior that the defendant does not deserve to be punished...
.Legal insanity is a social, moral, and legal issue, not a medical or psychi-
atric issue. The question in insanity defense cases is not whether the de-
fendant suffered from a mental disorder; the real issue that juries decide-
no matter what test they use-is whether the defendant's behavior related
to the offense was so crazy, so irrational, that the defendant should be
excused.
Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 
58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 777, 820-21 (1985) (footnote omitted).
142
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The widespread public distrust of the insanity defense has been well
documented. Recent statements of this distrust include:
o"Studies have consistently shown that the public is deeply suspi-
cious of the insanity defense."3 8
o"[M]any hold the belief that the presentation of mental health evi-
dence as a defense (or as mitigation at sentencing) is some kind of a
trick." 39
o"There is an unrealistic belief about the frequency with which the
insanity defense is used, leading people to assume that guilty men-
tally healthy people often fake insanity to plead the defense."40
o"The concerns over faking the insanity defense as a legal loophole
are now firmly engrained."41
o"It is very hard to make an insanity claim in a criminal context be-
cause the American public, which is generally suspicious of insanity
pleas, tends to view them as fakery simulated by the defendant to
avoid paying for a crime."42
The fear that a plea of insanity is "fakery" is not a recent development.4 3
Modern media coverage, however, likely exacerbates this problem. As one
scholar explained, "The widespread public belief that defendants frequently
38 Scott Brooks, Guilty by Reason oflnsanity: Why a Maligned Defense Demands a Consti-
tutionalRight ofInquiry on Voir Dire, 20 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1183, 1183 (2013).3 Andrea D. Lyon, The Blame Game: Public Antipathy to Mental Health Evidence in Crim-
inal Trials, 21 NEW CRIM. L. REv. 247, 255 (2018).
40 Beatrice R. Maidman, The Legal Insanity Defense: Transforming the Legal Theory into
A Medical Standard, 96 B.U. L. REv. 1831, 1846 (2016) (citing MATTHEW T. Huss,
FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND APPLICATIONS 165 (2009)).41 Michael J. Vitacco, Insanity Acquittees in the Community: Legal Foundations and Clini-
cal Conundrums, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 847, 851 (2016).
42 Carla Spivack, Killers Shouldn't Inherit from Their Victims-Or Should They?, 48 GA. L.
REv. 145, 214 (2013).
43 According to one recent writer:
In 1873, a prominent New York attorney declared, "Many a murder is
now committed upon a cold-blooded calculation of the chances in favor
of escaping the just consequences, through the convenient and elastic de-
fence of insanity." The defense, he claimed, was so often abused that
"people are beginning to be alarmed lest there be not sane persons enough
left to try the criminals."
Brooks, supra note 38, at 1197 (footnotes omitted).
2019]
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use the insanity defense to avoid punishment is largely attributable to high
profile cases and the attention that the media gives them."
44
Of course, the fear that insanity claims are fakery is not a wholly
illogical fear. A perfectly sane criminal defendant might well view a false
claim of insanity as a way to be found not guilty.
45 Undoubtedly, some crim-
inal defendants do successfully fake insanity.
4 6 However, every criminal de-
fense is subject to falsification.47 Self-defense has been claimed in numerous
cases where the government asserted that the crime scene was staged to look
like the defendant had acted in self-defense.
4 8 Similarly, defendants can
4 Julie E. Grachek, The Insanity Defense in the Twenty-First Century: How Recent United
States Supreme Court Case Law Can Improve the System, 81 IND. L.J. 1479, 1487 (2006)
(footnote omitted).
41 See, Ehren Park Reynolds, Protecting the Waterfront: Prosecuting Mob-Tied Union Of-
ficials Under the Hobbs Act and Rico After Scheidler, 10 BOALT J. OF 
CRIM. L. 2, 69 n. 6
(2005) ("In April 2003, Gigante pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice charges arising out
of a thirty-year ruse to fake insanity.").
46 Id.
4 See United States v. Williams, 698 F.3d 374, 387 (7th Cir. 2012) ("The problem the law-
yer faced-a client who wants to concoct a false alibi or other defense-is not rare.") (Ham-
ilton, J., dissenting).
48 See, e.g., Barnes v. Commonwealth, No. 2016-CA-001677-MR, 2018 WL 2754474, at *2
(Ky. Ct. App. June 8, 2018) ("Based on lack of blood on the gun and details provided by
Det. Hill and Freels, the Commonwealth developed its theory of the case-Miller's pistol
had been wiped clean of prints and Barnes had staged the scene to appear as self-defense.");
Hampton v. State, No. 03-14-00700-CR, 2017 WL 1315336, at *4 (Tex. App. Apr. 6, 2017)
("[T]he defensive theory of the case-that Hampton had stabbed Jennings in self-defense-
tended to be refuted by the physical evidence at the crime scene, which, according to the
testimony of one of the investigating officers, looked as if it had been 'staged' by Hampton
to suggest that Jennings had been the aggressor."); State v. Richter, No. 11-2124, 2013 WL
118357, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2013) ("The State emphasizes that, in addition to Rich-
ter's knowledge of the pink notebook, there was other evidence to indicate she staged mat-
ters to make it appear as if she killed Wehde in self-defense."); Trevino v. State, 100 S.W.3d
232, 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (en banc) ("The State argued that Trevino 
shot Michelle
in cold blood and staged the crime scene afterwards to make it look like self-defense.").
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readily assert false duress49 or alibi claims. 0 Yet, there is not the same deep,
generalized distrust of self-defense or alibi defenses, or any other defense,
as there is of the insanity defense.5 '
A review of recent state and federal opinions shows that there are a
few concerns about criminal defendants who might have faked symptoms of
a mental illness to support a claim of insanity.52 However, courts expressed
many more concerns about the possibility of fakery regarding issues other
49 See, e.g., United States v. Harp, 536 F.2d 601, 602 (5th Cir. 1976) ("At the consolidated
trial for attempted escape, two of those accused took the stand and presented a transparently
frivolous duress defense, claiming that only their co-defendant Chapman had intended to
escape."); John Lawrence Hill, A Utilitarian Theory ofDuress, 84 IOWA L. REv. 275, 328
(1999) ("[T]here is always the possibility that a false duress claim could be used as a cover
for bribery and collusion by corrupt witnesses."); Richard H. McAdams, The Political Econ-
omy ofEntrapment, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 107, 124 (2005) ("[M]embers of a con-
spiracy could fake a duress defense by claiming that one member threatened the rest.").
" See, e.g., Cattoor v. Gammon, 259 F. Supp. 2d 929, 931 (E.D. Mo. 2003) ("When police
contacted Cattoor about the For Lovers Only robbery, Cattoor presented his first of three
false alibis."); United States v. Dorsey, 677 F.3d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 2012) ("That Dorsey
tried to create a fake alibi was not merely ineffective, but also stands high in the hierarchy
of evidence tending to show guilt.").
s See Brooks, supra note 38, at 1183; Lyon, supra note 39, at 255; Maidman, supra note
40, at 1846; Spivack, supra note 42, at 214; Vitacco, supra note 41, at 851.
52 See, e.g., Watts v. Yates, 387 F. App'x 772, 776 (9th Cir. 2010) ("Moreover, Watts's
refusal to enter an insanity plea following the competency hearing also constituted important
new evidence because, like Dr. Zimmerman's reports, it contradicted Dr. Della Porta's con-
clusion, adopted by the court, that Watts was faking his mental illness to support an insanity
plea."); Brown v. Head, 285 F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 2002) ("It is evidence which tends
to show Brown was faking the crucial (to the diagnosis of the defense experts) symptoms
of being delusional, hearing voices, and generally being out of touch with reality and unable
to think clearly.").
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than insanity. For example, numerous opinions report concerns that defend-
ants in fraud cases were faking physical illnesses.
53 Other cases involved
defendants who were found to have faked kidnapping
54 or death."
Extensive research has shown that fears about defendants success-
fully faking an insanity defense are out of proportion to the actual risk that 
a
defendant will successfully fake an insanity defense.
5 6 As one scholar sum-
marized:
There is also much public concern about defendants who fake
their mental illnesses in order to escape a conviction and who
simply hire clinicians to engage in an expert battle with the
prosecution at trial. While these cases make for good media
See e.g., United States v. Rettenberger, 344 F.3d 702, 704 (7th Cir. 2003) ("A jury con-
cluded that Randall Rettenberger and his wife Julie were partners in a scheme to defraud
insurers, plus the Social Security Administration, by pretending that Randall was disa-
bled.").
5 See United States v. Baldwin, 418 F.3d 575, 577 (6th Cir. 2005) ("In February of 2003, a
grand jury indicted Anthony Baldwin on three counts of wire fraud and on one 
count of
conspiracy to defraud in connection with an attempt to obtain money by faking his 
own
kidnapping.").
51 See e.g., United States v. Crews, 496 F. App'x 896, 900 (11th Cir. 2012) ("[T]he district
court did not clearly err in denying Crews a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsi-
bility in the light of his attempt to evade punishment by faking a suicide."); United States v.
Nagle, 257 F. App'x 518, 519 (3d Cir. 2007) ("The convictions arose out of the defendants'
conspiracy to defraud State Farm Insurance Company by faking Nicholson's death.");
United States v. Washington, 248 F. App'x 86, 92 (11th Cir. 2007) ("Moreover, the conduct
supporting the obstruction enhancement-sending a false distress signal, faking his death,
fleeing to South Carolina, holding a funeral service in which he was eulogized by friends
and family, assuming a false identity using forged documents, and evading federal authon-
ties for approximately eight months--constituted much more than the mere act of 'sending
a false distress signal' and was not fully accounted for in the restitution Kevin was ordered
to pay.");
56 It is not as easy to fake insanity as people seem to think. Emergency room psychiatrist
Paul Linde provides one example of the ways that someone who is faking a mental disorder
can be detected: "'Do you ever see little green men?' I ask. It's one of my mini lie-detector
tests for malingering, since this symptom is essentially never reported by a genuinely psy-
chotic person." PAUL R. LINDE, DANGER TO SELF: ON THE FRONT LINE WITH AN 
ER
PSYCHIATRIST 128 (2010) See also Perez v. Cain, 529 F.3d 588, 599 (5th Cir. 2008) ("The
evidence that Perez used to show insanity was overwhelming. It included ... expert opinion
that it was very unlikely Perez and his family would know how to fake the illness; and
objective evidence that once he was given anti-psychotic medication, Perez's condition 
im-
proved in a manner that a layman would not know how to fabricate."). (arguing that
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play, they are the rare exception and not the rule. In fact, there
is overwhelming agreement on a clinical diagnosis between
clinicians on both sides of the criminal dispute. One study put
the clinician agreement rate at 88%; another at 92%. Moreo-
ver, the media and Hollywood exacerbate the fears of a de-
fendant feigning mental illness to avoid criminal punishment.
However, such fears are ill-founded. In practice, modem di-
agnostic instruments and procedures allow clinicians to dis-
tinguish correctly those who are truly mentally ill and those
who are faking between 92% and 95% of the time. Thus,
when defendants fake mental illness, it is extraordinarily dif-
ficult for them to "get away with" it.5 7
Despite the consensus of scholars that the public's fears of fakery are
exaggerated, these fears are not easily remedied.5 8 In fact, attempts to di-
rectly challenge misperceptions about the insanity defense can have the un-
intended consequence of reinforcing misperceptions.59 A recent article de-
scribes one such attempt by a sociologist:
In a thoughtful attempt at overcoming problematic attitudes
toward the insanity defense, one researcher suggested that a
flowchart, demonstrating the consequences and "time" com-
pleted with an insanity defense would ultimately prove useful
1 Henry F. Fradella, From Insanity to Beyond Diminished Capacity: Mental Illness and
Criminal Excuse in the Post-Clark Era, 18 U. FLA. J. OF L. & PUB. POL'Y 7, 12-13 (2007)
(footnotes omitted). See also Michael L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which Separated You from
Me ": The Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear ofFaking, and the Culture of
Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REv. 1375, 1410 (1997) ("Recent carefully-crafted empirical stud-
ies have clearly demonstrated that malingering among insanity defendants is, and tradition-
ally has been, statistically low. Even where it is attempted, it is fairly easy to discover (if
sophisticated diagnostic tools are used)."); Richard E. Redding, The Brain-Disordered De-
fendant: Neuroscience and Legal Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L. REv.
51, 111 (2006) ("[C]oncems often voiced about the insanity defense generally-that de-
fendants can readily fake insanity and that there are too many insanity acquittals, are myths
that have long since been debunked."); Phillip J. Resnick, The Andrea Yates Case: Insanity
on Trial, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 147, 154 (2007) ("An Oregon study showed that about 80%
of successful insanity cases are uncontested; that is, the experts for the prosecution and de-
fense agree that the defendant was insane.").
s8 See Jennifer L. Skeem et al., Venirepersons's Attitudes Toward the Insanity Defense:
Developing, Refining, and Validating a Scale, 28 L. & HuM. BEHAv. 623, 624-25 (2004).
5 See Vitacco, supra note 41, at 851.
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in the reduction of biases. As noted in this thesis, the presen-
tation to college students of information regarding disposi-
tional outcome had an unattended effect: those seeing the in-
formation about dispositional outcome became harsher in
their sentence and less inclined to support an insanity find-
ing.60
While direct challenges might be ineffective or even counterproduc-
tive, one indirect method of altering beliefs about the insanity defense that
might be effective is first-hand accounts of serious mental illnesses by peo-
ple who are not criminal defendants.61 Just as reports of people feigning men-
tal illness can raise fears, accounts of people who are experiencing serious
mental illnesses for no obvious gain (and at great obvious detriment) might
help remedy such fears. First-hand accounts of serious mental illness can
diminish fears of faking by demonstrating that people who are not facing
criminal charges, and thus do not have the same motive to lie that a criminal
defendant might have, still experience symptoms that would make someone
"insane"-that is,, specifically, unable to appreciate the nature or wrongful-
ness of his conduct,62 or more generally, so disconnected from reality that it
would be unfair to find him morally (or legally) responsible for his behav-
ior.63
I. CIVIL COMMITMENT AND INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT
60 Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Caroline B. Crocker & Margaret Bull Kovera, The Effects
of Rehabilitative Voir Dire on Juror Bias and Decision Making, 34 L. HUM. BEHAV. 212,
220 (2010).
61 See Marc A. Fajer, Authority, Credibility, and Pre- Understanding: A Defense of Outsider
Narratives in Legal Scholarship, 82 GEO. L.J. 1845, 1859 (1994) (arguing that "first-person
stories have significant advantages over third-party stories for countering common pre-un-
derstandings"); Mary Kay Kisthardt, Mental Health, Psychology, and the Law, 82 UMKC
L. REv. 279, 279 (2014) ("First person stories are perhaps the best teachers of the important
lessons about mental illness.").
62See Jamie D. Brooks, "What Any Parent Knows" but the Supreme Court Misunderstands:
Reassessing Nueroscience's Role in Diminished Capacity Jurisprudence, 17 NEW CRIM L.
REV. 442,477 (2014)
63See Morse, supra note 37, at 820-21 (showing that at their core, tests of insanity can be
considered essentially tests of moral responsibility). Cf id. at 501 (finding that the law holds
someone blameless when "a mental condition .. .produces a disconnect between an agent's
apparent conduct and the potentially blameless intentions that he consciously entertained").
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People who are a danger to themselves or others because of mental
illness are subject to civil commitment.6 4 Civil commitment is justified by
two separate government powers: the police power to protect public safety,
and the parens patriae power to protect people who are unable to protect
themselves.65
Several controversies surround the practice of civil commitment.
First, civil commitment is a kind of preventive detention-it allows for the
detention of someone who might cause harm in the future.66 But preventive
detention is generally disfavored.6 7 Criminal law punishes people for harms
that they have already caused; it does not punish them, or detain them, on
the basis of harms that they might cause in the future.68 Similarly, tort law
imposes damages for harms caused in the past but not for harms that might
be caused in the future.6 9 Thus, one criticism of civil commitment is that its
special treatment of people who are mentally ill is not justified; someone
who is dangerous but not mentally ill cannot be civilly committed,70 so why
should someone who is dangerous because of a mental illness be subject to
this kind of detention?
' O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1975).65id
66 See id. at 566 n.2.
67 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) ("In our society liberty is the norm,
and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception."). Cf McGee
v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 581 (7th Cir. 2010) ("The primary due process concern of the
Supreme Court in the area of civil commitment is the necessity of distinguishing between
the typical dangerous recidivist and the offender whose dangerousness is caused by some
identifiable mental condition that impairs his ability to refrain from activity dangerous to
others.").
68 United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1002-03 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Permitting
an arrested person thought to be dangerous to remain at liberty unquestionably incurs a risk.
The prediction of dangerous conduct, however difficult to make and however unreliable,
will undoubtedly be correct in some instances. But all guarantees of liberty entail risks, and
under our Constitution those guarantees may not be abolished whenever government prefers
that a risk not be taken.") (footnote omitted).
69 Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, Liability for Future Harm, in PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION
221, 222 (Richard Goldberg ed. 2011).
70 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) ("A finding of dangerousness, standing
alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary com-
mitment. We have sustained civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of
dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as a 'mental illness' or 'mental
abnormality."').
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Another question about civil commitment is what constitutional lim-
its or requirements might exist. The Supreme Court has held that mental ill-
ness alone is insufficient grounds for civil commitment," but the Court has
never directly held that dangerousness is constitutionally required.
72 Many
states are moving toward civil commitment statutes that have criteria that
seem to justify civil commitment on the grounds that untreated mental illness
is harmful.7 3 This movement raises the question of whether the state ought
to force someone to receive treatment for a mental illness. Opponents of in-
voluntary treatment of the mentally ill argue that people have a right to
choose to be mentally ill, even if that choice is harmful.
74 Because the state
does not compel treatment for other illnesses, such as diabetes or high blood
pressure, the argument is that the state is singling out people with mental
illnesses, perhaps unfairly or without sufficient justification.
Additionally, civil commitment allows only for the detention of peo-
ple who are mentally ill and dangerous-it does not necessarily allow for the
involuntary administration of psychotropic medications.
76 People who are
being detained under traditional civil commitment statutes retain the right 
to
7' O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 576 ("[A] state cannot constitutionally confine in a mental hospi-
tal, without more, a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom
by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends.").
72 Some other courts have held this, but not the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt,
349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
7 See, e.g., Douglas Mossman, et al., Risky Business Versus Overt Acts: What Relevance
Do "Actuarial, " Probabilistic Risk Assessments Have for Judicial Decisions on Involuntary
Psychiatric Hospitalization?, 11 Hous. J. OF HEALTH L. & POL'Y 365, 382 (2012) ("Almost
all states also permit commitment because of what often is termed 'grave disability,' a
phrase referring to the condition of persons who do not express wishes or try to harm them-
selves, but who so neglect their basic needs as to put their lives in peril."); Donald Stone,
Dangerous Minds: Myths and Realities Behind the Violent Behavior of the Mentally Ill,
Public Perceptions, and the Judicial Response Through Involuntary Civil Commitment, 42
L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 59, 62 (2018) (noting "the increasing popularity of a 'gravely disabled'
standard").
7 Catherine E. Blackburn, The "Therapeutic Orgy" and the "Right to Rot" Collide: The
Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs Under State Law, 27 Hous. L. REv. 447 (1990).
" Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190, 1215-16 (1974) ("Civil
commitment statutes authorize different treatment of the mentally ill and the physically ill
by subjecting the former group to compulsory care while allowing the latter group to choose
whether to seek treatment.").
76 Blackburn, supra note 74, at 462, 476.
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refuse medications,77 except in emergency situations78 or if found incompe-
tent to make their own medical treatment decisions.7 9 For some mental ill-
nesses, particularly those characterized by psychotic symptoms, detention
without medication is unlikely to be very helpful, and in fact can be very
harmful. 0
Those who are detained on the grounds that they are mentally ill and
dangerous often are eventually administered involuntary psychotropic med-
ications (either because their untreated psychosis creates an emergency or
because they are found incompetent refuse treatment)." But once the medi-
cations have diminished their dangerousness, they must be released-and
then they are free to stop taking the medications.82 Without medications, the
psychotic symptoms, and the dangerousness, often return, resulting in further
civil commitment.83 The obvious long-term ineffectiveness of this system
has prompted some legislatures to enact outpatient civil commitment pro-
grams, which involve less physical confinement but more involuntary med-
ication.84
The growing popularity of outpatient commitment programs, with
their emphasis on coercing people to take medications, has renewed debates
about the desirability of involuntary treatment.85 One of the most important,
n Id. at 476; Samuel Jan Brakel & John M. Davis, Taking Harms Seriously: Involuntary
Mental Patients and the Right to Refuse Treatment, 25 IND. L. REv. 429, 433-34 (1991).78 Blackburn, supra note 74, at 505-06.
79 Brakel & Davis, supra note 77, at 469-70.
0 Id. at 453 ("Substantial clinical harms can result to patients who are not treated in a timely
fashion.").
81 See Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Psychotropic Medication: Three Alternatives to
the Law's Cognitive Standard, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 689, 737 n.113 (1993).
82 Stuart A. Anfang & Paul S. Appelbaum, Civil Commitment - The American Experience,
43 ISR. J. PSYCHIATRY RELATED Sci. 209, 216 (2006).
8 See id. at 215-17.
84 See Howard Telson, Outpatient Commitment in New York: From Pilot Program to State
Law, 11 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L. J. 41, 41 (2000) ("Outpatient commitment was devel-
oped to promote compliance when symptoms of mental illness cause individuals to neglect
or reject community mental health services. It was conceptualized as a less restrictive alter-
native to inpatient psychiatric treatment. Some states have permitted outpatient commitment
for individuals who do not meet the criteria for involuntary hospitalization, but predictably
deteriorate without treatment.").
8 Monahan, supra note 28, at 401-02. Compare Samuel Jan Brakel & John M. Davis, M.D.,
Overriding Mental Health Treatment Refusals: How Much Process Is "Due"?, 52 ST. Louis
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yet most contentious, questions regarding serious mental illnesses is when
(if ever) the state is justified in compelling people who are experiencing psy-
chotic symptoms to take medications over their objections.
86 Almost all
scholars who have considered this question believe that involuntary medica-
tions may be justified if someone lacks competence to make her own treat-
ment decisions." Generally, competence to make treatment decisions re-
quires some degree of understanding about the illness and the proposed
treatment.88 However, disagreement exists regarding how deep this under-
standing ought to be in order for someone to be considered competent.
8 9 Is
it enough that someone knows that his doctor believes that he has an illness
that requires a certain treatment, or must he accept that the illness actually
exists?90 This question is extremely important for people who are expenenc-
ing symptoms of a serious mental illness, but who might not understand what
they are experiencing to be an illness.
91 On one hand, some scholars argue
that respect for autonomy requires a very restrictive definition of incompe-
tence to make treatment decisions, so that only those who lack the most basic
understanding of what their doctors say is an illness will meet the standard
U. L.J. 501, 585 (2008) (arguing that "if the patient cannot be convinced to accept the pre-
scribed treatment, rejecting it and any plausible alternative courses including trial and error,
the physician should be allowed to initiate treatment over the patient's objection with min-
imal legal interference"), with Stone, supra note 73, at 83 (2018) ("We should return to the
standard of real evidence that the person is currently a danger to himself or others before we
resort to confining someone against his will.").
86 See Candice T. Player, Involuntary Outpatient Commitment: The Limits ofPrevention, 26
STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 159, 163-64, 210 (2015).
8 See id. at 164, 190.
' See id. at 221-25.
89 See id.
90 For a brief but thorough discussion, see id. at 221. Player describes the minimum level 
of
understanding necessary for competence:
A person who is competent to refuse treatment must possess at least a
rudimentary understanding of the basic features of his illness and the pro-
posed treatment plan. Whether he believes he has an illness or not, and
whether he believes that treatment will help him or not, he must at least
understand that his physician believes he has an illness and that his phy-
sician believes the recommended treatment could help him. Any less, and
we would worry that the person is too impaired or too disoriented for us
to view his treatment decisions as competent.
Id. at 221.
91 Player, supra note 86, at 229.
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for incompetence.92 This restrictive standard is necessary, these scholars ar-
gue, in order to maintain respect for autonomy and personhood.93 Other
scholars argue that people who are experiencing serious mental illness yet
refuse treatment because they do not believe they have an illness are incapa-
ble of making a truly autonomous decision regarding treatment. 94 If they do
not understand that their thinking is disordered, these scholars argue, then
their refusal of treatment is not really an autonomous choice but rather a
92 As one scholar proposes:
[T]he central question should be: "Do you understand that Doctor X be-
lieves that some of your thoughts and behaviors are attributable to Disease
Y? Do you understand that according to Doctor X, consequences A, B, C,
and D are likely to follow if you refuse the recommended course of treat-
ment?" If the person understands the basic facts of his or her illness in this
sense, then provided that his or reasons are at least neither irrelevant nor
patently and demonstrably false, he or she is competent o make decisions
regarding outpatient treatment and courts should not order outpatient
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choice compelled by their mental illness.
9 5 According to such a view, admin-
istering involuntary medications can be more respectful of autonomy than
allowing the refusal of medications.
96
In a country that values civil liberties, should the government ever
detain someone because she might cause harm? Or compel her to take med-
ications that she does not want to take? Answering these questions requires
an understanding of serious mental illnesses. What kinds of behaviors would
cause someone to be found dangerous because of a mental illness? Under
what circumstances is involuntary treatment likely to be imposed? For peo-
ple who have not experienced civil commitment or involuntary treatment,
accounts of those who have are perhaps the best way to understand what it
means to be subjected to these practices.
III. LESSONS FROM MEMOIRS OF MENTAL ILLNESS
This part presents evidence of serious mental illnesses from a range
of memoirs, including first-person accounts as well as accounts of close fam-
ily members. The memoirs discussed are:
9 Id. Psychiatrist Paul Appelbaum suggested a distinction between "formal autonomy" and
"meaningful autonomy":
Meaningful autonomy does not consist merely in the ability to make
choices for oneself. Witness the psychotic ex-patients on the streets, who
withdraw into rarely used doorways, rigidly still for hours at a time, hop-
ing . .. that immobility will help them fade into the grimy urban back-
ground, bringing safety and temporary peace from a world which they
envision as a terrifying series of threats. Can the choices they make, lim-
ited as they are to the selection of a doorway for the day, be called a sig-
nificant embodiment of human autonomy? Or is their behavior rather to
be understood on the level of a simple reflex-autonomous only in a
strictly formal sense?
Paul S. Appelbaum, Crazy in the Streets, in ETHICS OF PSYCHIATRY: INSANITY, RATIONAL
AUTONOMY, AND MENTAL HEALTH CARE 537, 547 (Rem B. Edwards ed., 1997). Accord
Harold I. Schwartz et al., Autonomy and the Right to Refuse Treatment: Patients'Attitudes
After Involuntary Medication, 39 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1049, 1054 (1988)
("Strategies for protecting the autonomy of patients who refuse treatment 
must consider the
erosion of autonomy that psychosis produces."); David L. Bazelon, Institutionalization, De-
institutionalization and the Adversary Process, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 897, 907 (1975) ("How
real is the promise of individual autonomy for a confused person set adrift in a 
hostile
world?").
96 See Appelbaum, supra note 95, at 547.
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In Crazy, journalist Pete Earley alternates between presenting an
account of Earley's son's psychosis and Earley's research into
the mental health system generally.9 7
In Madness: A Bipolar Life, Marya Hornbacher provides a first-
person account of bipolar disorder.98
In An Unquiet Mind, Kay Redfield Jamison presents a first-per-
son account of bipolar disorder. Jamison is a psychologist who
has also published academic articles about bipolar disorder.99
In Ben Behind His Voices, Randye Kaye presents an account of
her family's experience of her son Ben's schizophrenia.o10
In My Lovely Wife in the Psych Ward, Mark Lukach describes his
wife Giulia's experience of bipolar disorder.'o
In The Center Cannot Hold, Elyn R. Saks provides a first-person
account of schizophrenia. Saks is a law professor who has also
published academic works about mental health law issues, in-
cluding involuntary treatment.10 2
In Divided Minds, Pamela Spiro Wagner and Carolyn S. Spiro
provide an alternating account, presenting the different perspec-
tives of identical twins, one who describes her experience of
schizophrenia.10 3
A. The Insanity Defense
97 PETE EARLEY, CRAZY: A FATHER'S SEARCH THROUGH AMERICA'S MENTAL HEALTH
MADNESS (2006).
98 MARYA HORNBACHER, MADNESS: A BIPOLAR LIFE (2008).
9 KAY REDFIELD JAMISON, AN UNQUIET MIND: A MEMOIR OF MOODS AND MADNESS
(1995).
100 RANDYE KAYE, BEN BEHIND His VOICES: ONE FAMILY'S JOURNEY FROM THE CHAOS OF
SCHIZOPHRENIA TO HOPE (2011).
'01 MARK LUKACH, MY LOVELY WIFE IN THE PSYCH WARD (2017).
102 ELYN R. SAKS, THE CENTER CANNOT HOLD: MY JOURNEY THROUGH MADNESS (2007).
103 PAMELA SPIRO WAGNER & CAROLYN S. SPIRO, DIVIDED MINDS: TWIN SISTERS AND
THEIR JOURNEY THROUGH SCHIZOPHRENIA (2005).
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Perhaps the most important educational function that memoirs of
mental illnesses can serve is to provide concrete examples of delusional be-
liefs. There is no doubt among psychiatrists, psychologists, and other treat-
ment providers that delusional beliefs exist and that they are commonly ex-
perienced symptoms of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.'
04 However, the
technical definition of delusions, "fixed beliefs that are not amenable to
change in light of conflicting evidence,"
05 does little to help a layperson
understand what a delusion is, or why someone who is in the grip of a delu-
sional belief might not be morally (or legally) responsible for her behavior.
The specific examples of delusions described in memoirs of mental
illnesses can be more helpful. For example, among the symptoms that Earley
describes his son Mike exhibiting early in his psychosis are the beliefs that a
movie and a bumper sticker contained special messages for him, that he was
God's "special messenger," and that wrapping his head in aluminum foil
would prevent other people from reading his thoughts:
[Mike] found a videocassette on the sidewalk while walking
to a subway near Times Square. It was Oliver Stone's movie
Heaven and Earth, a gut-wrenching account by a Vietnamese
woman about the fighting there and its aftermath. Mike had
watched it three times, and he had become convinced it con-
tained a secret message aimed at him.
"As soon as you see it, everything will make sense," he
told me. "You'll see." . .
Mike saw an encrypted message in a bumper sticker on
the blue sedan ahead of us: "Believe in Him!" It was a signal
from God, he told me. They were everywhere. But only he
could interpret them ....
... [T]he doctor asked Mike, "Who's the president of the
United States?"
"That idiot George Bush."
"What day is it today?"
104 AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MLANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 87, supra note 26, at 128.
10 Id. at 87.
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Other questions followed: "Can you count backwards by
sevens from a hundred? What does the phrase 'Don't cry over
spilled milk' mean? How about the words 'a heavy heart'?"
Mike answered each question easily. Then he explained
that he was God's personal messenger and that he was inde-
structible....
I returned to my ex-wife's house where Mike was watching
television, only now he'd wrapped aluminum foil around his
head so no one could read his thoughts.106
Lukach describes his wife Giulia telling him that she hears the Devil
telling her that she is worthless. Lukach recounts a conversation that oc-
curred just before her first hospitalization: "'I talked to the Devil last night,
Mark,' she said, speaking very loudly and quickly. 'He said everything is not
going to be okay. He said that there is no way out of this. I can't be saved.
I'm not worth saving. We might as well just give up."'"o7 During her hospi-
talization, she continued to receive messages from the Devil; for example,
she did not want Lukach to visit her, shouting, "Get out! The Devil is here
and he wants you. You need to leave now!"'i0
Pamela Spiro Wagner writes of her early delusions and hallucina-
tions, which she experienced as a college student:
People start whispering behind my back, talking about
what they're going to do to me, but no one will tell me any-
thing to my face. Gemma, the red-haired Unitarian who is my
roommate and with whom I was once best of friends, now
hates me with a passion. She and her friends-once my
friends-start playing a cat-and-mouse game with me, but my
safety depends on pretending not to notice. I learn to recog-
nize that the red sweater she sometimes wears signals bad
days, days when they are going to torment me, though I never
let on I know that anything at all is afoot.
Confused, exhausted, buffeted by voices that now seem
to be in cahoots with Gemma and the others, I begin to stay
in bed day and night.
106 EARLEY, supra note 97, at 7-8, 15, 20.
107 LUKACH, supra note 101, at 26.
'0 1 Id. at 47.
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. . . I suspect that Gemma has put something in my food,
some poison. My stomach is tight and it's harder and harder
to eat anything. In a way this is a relief, as it gives me an
excuse not to go to the dining room with Gemma and the oth-
ers anymore, which is obviously no longer safe.
109
She describes the experience of similar although intensified symp-
toms years later:
I need to have a tooth filled. ...
A few days later, I come to understand that amalgam is not
all the dentist filled the tooth with. I realize from various signs
and evidence around me that he implanted a computer micro-
chip for reasons I can't yet determine. The computers at the
drugstore across the street, programmed by the Five People,
have tapped into my TV set and monitor my activities with a
special radar. If I go out, special agents keep every one of my
movements under surveillance. A man lighting a cigarette
near the drugstore uses his lighter to signal to another just
down the street, warning him of my approach. Another alerts
conspirators inside. Nothing I do, indoors or out, goes unre-
marked.10
The experience of delusional beliefs is often central to a claim of in-
sanity because it is often a delusional belief that makes the defendant unable
to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of his or her actions.'" If Eric Clark
believed that he was shooting an alien that was a threat to his life and the
lives of other people, then he could not have intended to shoot a police of-
ficer.1 12 Assessing a claim like Clark's requires an understanding that such
beliefs are possible. Memoirs can help provide this understanding.
B. Civil Commitment and Involuntary Treatment
109 WAGNER & SPIRO, supra note 103, at 105-06.
110 Id. at 205.
... See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. at 735.
112 See id. at 745.
158
Memoir as Witness to Mental Illness 159
Memoirs of mental illness can also help inform discussions about the
proper rules regarding civil commitment and involuntary treatment by al-
lowing those who have never personally been subject to these rules to un-
derstand something of what it is like for those who have.
1. "Thank You" Theory
One issue concerning civil commitment and involuntary treatment is
whether people who have been civilly committed or administered involun-
tary treatment later, in retrospect, come to believe that these measures were
beneficial."3 Some writers, especially some psychiatrists, have proposed
that many people do later appreciate treatment that they opposed at the time;
this idea is often called the "thank you" theory of involuntary treatment.'14
Memoirs of mental illness do not provide much support for this the-
ory. For example, Earley describes a conversation with a nurse, in which he
expresses ambivalence about the actions he needed to take to have his son
committed, including fabricating a claim that his son had threatened him. 15
The nurse says, "Twenty years ago, you could get someone committed into
a mental hospital just by accusing them of being crazy. . . . But now the law
has swung so far the other way that you can't get them help even though you
know they will thank you later."ll6 However, Earley never suggests that his
son does eventually thank him."17
Additionally, none of the first-person accounts provide any clear
statements of gratitude for involuntary treatment. Saks acknowledges the
benefits of the treatment but remains opposed to the fact that it was admin-
istered against her wishes." For example, she writes of one of her first hos-
pitalizations:
For a place that existed ostensibly to promote the mental
health of the vulnerable people in its care, YPI had been a
brutal experience for me. I'd spent the better part of two days
locked up, tied down, and forced to swallow a medication that
i1 Player, supra note 86, at 210.1 14 Id
11 EARLEY, supra note 97, at 24-25.
"7 See id. at 24-31.
1"8See SAKS, supra note 102, at 157.
2019]
Law & Psychology Review
(while not without its benefits) quickly made its side effects
apparent: my face felt wooden and looked like a mask; my
gait had slowed until it resembled a stroke victim's shuffle
more than my own long-legged stride.
1 19
And later, describing one of many attempts to discontinue antipsy-
chotic medication, Saks writes:
By day five, I was completely and floridly psychotic, con-
vinced that evil beings were about to destroy me. I gibbered;
I cowered. I couldn't work, and the end of the final term was
coming up. Finally, White [her psychiatrist] insisted: back to
the Navane, and increase it again. The effect was almost im-
mediate, but instead of being relieved, I was angry. I'm sick
of this. It all came down to supporting the patient's choice-
didn't it? If I was competent when I decided to stop taking
the meds, then it was a competently made decision.
120
Jamison is less clear about her ultimate feelings about forced treat-
ment, seeming to regret both the violence of the forced treatment as well 
as
the violence that resulted in that treatment:
I have, in my psychotic, seizure like attacks-my black, ag-
itated manias-destroyed things I cherish, pushed to the ut-
ter edge people I love, and survived to think I could never
recover from the shame. I have been physically restrained by
terrible, brute force; kicked and pushed to the floor; thrown
on my stomach with my hands pinned behind my back; and,
heavily medicated against my will.
I do not know how I have recovered from having done
the things that necessitated such actions. . ..
.... After each of my violent psychotic episodes, I had to try
and reconcile my notion of myself as a reasonably quiet-spo-
ken and highly disciplined person, one at least generally sen-
sitive to the moods and feelings of others, with an enraged,
119 Id.
120 Id. at 210.
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utterly insane, and abusive woman who lost access to all con-
trol or reason.12 1
Hombacher writes of more than a dozen hospitalizations, many that
she resisted.122 Although she never addresses the issue directly, the book's
closing, which describes her acceptance of another hospitalization, might be
seen as an indirect "thank you" for previous hospitalizations:
By the time we get to the hospital, I'm no longer under the
impression that I'm sane. Once I've started cutting, I know
I'm not likely to stop until I've done some serious damage,
and I don't want that any more than anyone else does. The
last place I want to be is the hospital, but I'm not stupid. I
know when it's time to go in. I am so terrified of myself and
of the vast, frightening world, that the psych ward, with its
safe locked doors, sounds like a relief.12 3
2. Lack ofInsight
Another issue in the middle of the involuntary treatment debate is the
extent to which people who are experiencing psychotic symptoms are capa-
ble of recognizing these symptoms as signs of a disorder.124 Recent research
suggests that some people experiencing psychotic symptoms are neurologi-
cally incapable of understanding their illnesses.125 Lack of insight is one rea-
son why people refuse antipsychotic medications.126 However, several other
reasons, including medication side effects and psychological struggle with
the idea of being ill, also can cause someone to refuse medications. 127
Several first-person writers explain at least some of their resistance
to medication as a preference for the disease over the treatment. Wagner
121 JAMISON, supra note 99, at 120-21.
122 See generally HORNBACHER, supra note 98.
123 Id. at 270.
124 Xavier F. Amador & Andrew A. Shiva, Insight into Schizophrenia: Anosognosia, Com-
petency, and Civil Liberties, 11 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 25, 27 (2000).
125 Id. at 25.
126 See id at 38-39.
127 See id. at 26, 37-38.
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flatly states, "I don't care that Zyprexa would help. I hate it more than any-
thing, even more than being insane."l
28 Jamison offers a more comprehen-
sive account of her assessment of the costs and benefits of medications:
My manias, at least in their early and mild forms, were
absolutely intoxicating states that gave rise to great personal
pleasure, an incomparable flow of thoughts, and a ceaseless
energy that allowed the translation of new ideas into papers
and projects. Medications not only cut into these fast-flowing,
high-flying times, they also brought with them seemingly in-
tolerable side effects. It took me far too long to realize that
lost years and relationships cannot be recovered, that damage
done to oneself and others cannot always be put right again,
and that freedom from the control imposed by medication
loses its meaning when the only alternatives are death and
insanity.12
Relatedly, Saks and Jamison both write about their beliefs that taking
medication was a form of weakness. Jamison writes: "I genuinely believed-
courtesy of strong-willed parents, my own stubbornness, and a WASP mili-
tary upbringing-that I ought to be able to handle whatever difficulties came
my way without having to rely upon crutches such as medication.""
3 Saks
similarly writes: "For so many years, I'd resisted the 'crutch' of the meds-
to use them meant I was weak of will, weak of character."
131
Saks's early resistance to identifying her experiences as symptoms
of an illness that required medication, rather than reactions to situational
stressors that she needed some temporary help to manage, is evident in a
conversation with her psychiatrist, who is encouraging her to accept her need
for medication:
By week four [of decreased antipsychotic medications],
I'd arrived in the land of full-fledged psychosis. The people
in the sky poison me. I in turn will poison the world.
128 WAGNER & SPIRO, supra note 103, at 298.
129 JAMISON, supra note 99, at 5-6.
13 0 Id. at 99.
131 SAKS, supra note 102, at 282.
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"I think you're having thoughts that are scaring you be-
cause you need to be on more medication now," said White
[her psychiatrist].
"No!" I was practically shouting. "It has nothing to do
with drugs. It's a massive attempt at medical and physiolog-
ical, not to say psychological, derailment which was a result
of deregulation of the rail!"
"It's hard to admit you need medications," said White.
"But you do."
Defeat, defeat. "There's no need. I'm not sick. I'm
wicked. La di da. I'm ever so well, thank you, ever so well."
But we both knew I'd hit the damn wall again. And as
soon as he increased the Navane, I started feeling better. But
this has nothing to do with me being sick. It's just about being
able to study. I'm not sick, I just need some help so that I can
study."1 32
She describes holding similar beliefs years later:
In spite of my history, in spite of the diagnoses and the pre-
scriptions, the frequent delusions and the evil visitations ...
I still wasn't convinced that I had a mental illness. Nor was
I convinced I really needed medication. To admit to any of
it was to admit that my brain was profoundly broken, and I
just couldn't do that....
... Yes, the pills helped, but each time I put them in my
mouth, it was a reminder that some people-smart people I
trusted and respected-believed that I was mentally ill, that I
was defective; every dose of Navane was a concession to that.
More than anything, I wanted to be healthy and whole; I
wanted to exist in the world as my authentic self-and I
deeply believed that the drugs undermined that.133
Unlike Jamison, who expresses some regrets about the years that she
resisted psychotropic medications, Saks views her resistance to medication
as a "necessary stage of development"::
132 Id. at 204.
133 Id. at 244-45.
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As exasperating and frightening as my years-long process of
tinkering with my meds was for my friends and physicians, I
understand now that it was hugely important for me to do it;
it was a necessary stage of development hat I needed to go
through to become my full-fledged self. It was the only way
I could come to terms with the illness.
134
3. Family
Another issue raised by many memoirs is what consideration, if any,
should be given to family members' suffering when deciding when civil
commitment or involuntary medication is appropriate.13 As Lukach tells his
wife, bipolar disorder was not something that only happened to her; it hap-
pened to her family as well: "Families lose when people treat 
mental illness
like it impacts only one person. This is your illness, but it's actually all of
ours."1 36
In their memoirs, family members write of their desperation for their
loved ones to be admitted to a hospital and administered medications." Wit-
nessing the devastation that untreated psychotic symptoms are causing, these
family members are willing to endure the potentially relationship-ending
consequences of advocating for involuntary treatment because they believe
that treatment is the only way to save their loved one's life.
138 In the final
134 Id. at 282.
135 Currently, no formal consideration is given to the emotional suffering of family mem-
bers. Two psychiatrists suggest that some consideration should be given, writing "the 
civil
rights of an individual may be at odds with the heartbreak of a caring family 
and . .. the
concerns of loved ones cannot simply be ignored," but they do not suggest what that con-
sideration should be. DINAH MILLER, & ANNETTE HANSON, COMMITTED: THE BATTLE 
OVER
INVOLUNTARY PSYCHIATRIC CARE xx (2016).
136 LUKACH, supra note 101, at 220.
3 See EARLEY, supra note 97, at 22; KAYE, supra note 100, at 171.
138 At least one psychiatrist has recognized that this is a common if not universal problem:
I do everything I can to get patients to come in voluntarily. If the patient
needs to be committed despite all my efforts, I do everything I can to pro-
tect their relationship with their loved ones who brought them for help.
Even when a committed patient gets well, and even if he comes to agree
that hospitalization was necessary, he may never forgive the parent or
spouse who initiated the commitment. Still, if you have to do it to 
save
their life, then I tell the family, "We have to do this."
MILLER & HANSON, supra note 135, at 123 (reporting statement of Dr. J. Raymond 
DePaulo
Jr., the chief psychiatrist at Johns Hopkins Hospital).
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pages of his book, Earley writes that another parent of a seriously mentally
ill child told him,
[P]arents with mentally ill children were given a choice: Ei-
ther you could become despondent and wallow in pity, or you
- could have a good cry and start fighting back. I now under-
stood that fighting back meant doing whatever was necessary
as a parent, even if it meant having your own child hate
you. 139
Lukach describes his conflicted feelings regarding forced medica-
tions during his wife's first hospitalization, when a nurse informs him that a
judge has ruled that Giulia will be held under California section 5250140.
"The judge signed off on the doctor's request," she said.
"Giulia has been upgraded to a 5250." . . .
"So now this means Giulia can't refuse her medication,
right?" I said.
"Right," the nurse said.
"So did she get her medication?" I pressed....
"She got her medicine this morning, right after the hear-
ing," she said quietly.
"Did she take the medication voluntarily?" I asked.
"She did not take the pills by herself But she got her
medication."
I knew what that meant. I closed my eyes and imag-
ined three nurses walking into Giulia's room, offering her
pills, knowing she would refuse them, and then holding her
'19 EARLEY, supra note 97, at 360.
140 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5250 (West 2014). Under California law, involuntary med-
ications may only be administered to someone who has been found incompetent to refuse
treatment:
If any person subject to detention pursuant to Section 5150, 5250, 5260,
or 5270.15, and for whom antipsychotic medication has been prescribed,
orally refuses or gives other indication of refusal of treatment with that
medication, the medication shall be administered only when treatment
staff have considered and determined that treatment alternatives to invol-
untary medication are unlikely to meet the needs of the patient, and upon
a determination of that person's incapacity to refuse the treatment, in a
hearing held for that purpose.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5332(b) (West 2001).
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down as they rolled up her hospital gown to expose her thigh
for an injection. This is what a 5250 meant. And I had showed
up early, in a shirt and tie, to argue that Giulia needed the
5250. But the image of it, the nurses pressing on her body,
Giulia tensed and yelling and resisting whatever way she
could, and them injecting her anyway, and knowing with cer-
tainty that it had happened, felt so tragic that it eclipsed the
anger that had been boiling over.
14 1
Jamison, in a later memoir that is primarily about her relationship
with her husband and only indirectly about her experience of bipolar disor-
der, provides another example of the terrible choice that those 
who love
someone with a mental illness sometimes must make: the choice to imperil
the relationship for the sake of obtaining treatment. In Jamison's case, her
husband was a physician, and she describes how she discovered that he was
prepared to administer to her an injection of antipsychotic 
medication:
Glancing around his office, I saw his black doctor's bag in
the corner of the room, sitting on top of a file cabinet. It
seemed odd, although I had never thought about it before.
Why did he have his doctor's bag in his home study instead
of at the office we rented together to see patients?
I asked him if I could see what he kept inside his bag.
He was uncomfortable with the idea and only reluctantly
took it down for me to open. There was not much inside-
prescription pads, his stethoscope, a blood pressure cuff, a
reflex hammer-but after rummaging around for a while, I
found at the bottom of the bag what I think I knew I would
find. Beneath the instruments of his practice lay a syringe
and a vial of antipsychotic medication.
I didn't have to ask. It was for me, in case I became
manic. Seeing the syringe triggered memories of being forci-
bly medicated after I first had become psychotic years earlier.
I felt trapped and, more fundamentally, betrayed. 142
Even when things are going well, the fear of relapse because of dis-
continuing medications can be consuming. Earley describes one encounter
141 LUKACH, supra note 101, at 54-55.
142 KAY REDFIELD JAMISON, NOTHING WAS THE SAME 22-23 (2009).
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with his son when he believed that his son might have stopped taking his
medication:
I telephoned him at his job and asked him to stop by my
house that night. I knew he'd be angry when I confronted
him. But I didn't care....
. . . "Is this how it's going to be between us from now
on?" he asked. "Are you going to freak out all of the time-
worry all of the time whether or not I am taking my medica-
tion, whether or not I'm going to go crazy again?"
"No," I said. But it was a lie....
... I wanted to believe Mike would never go off his med-
ication, never have another relapse. But I knew too much
now to be so confident... . I'd talked to too many other par-
ents. Every one of them had also wanted to believe that their -
child would beat the odds, that everything would work out
for the best, that their son and their daughter would be dif-
ferent. But none of them had.
I told Mike it was going to take time for me to learn how
to not worry.
"Just stay on your meds," I pleaded. "Please stay on your
meds."l43
4. Imminence ofHarm
Civil commitment is permitted only when someone is presently a
danger to himself or someone else.144 Involuntary medication requires an
143 EARLEY, supra note 97, at 282-83.
144 Definitions of dangerousness vary:
Dangerousness is usually interpreted to mean physical harm to self, in-
cluding attempted suicide, or to others, including overt acts and threats of
violence. At one time, most states required evidence of recent and overt
threats or actions to establish that the individual posed a danger to others,
but many states now allow predictions of future dangerousness to be es-
tablished based on recent behavior. Some states require that the danger be
imminent, or likely to occur immediately or in the near future, while oth-
ers have eliminated the imminence requirement, as long as the danger is
substantial. Other statutes do not define dangerousness or include a
timeframe, but simply require that the person pose a threat of harm to
herself or others.
2019]
Law & Psychology Review
emergency, unless the person being medicated is incompetent to refuse 
treat-
ment.145 These standards are intended to protect the civil liberties of people
with mental illnesses.14 6 However, these standards all but guarantee that
someone will experience significant psychological, social, and perhaps legal
harms before they can be hospitalized or medicated against their wishes.
147
The current rules might establish the proper trade-offs. Still, it is easy for
people, the public in general and lawmakers in particular, to imagine 
how
they might feel if they are detained or medicated against their wishes.
148 It is
likely harder to imagine how a parent of a psychotic child feels when she is
told that there is nothing that can be done to help her obtain treatment for her
obviously seriously mentally ill child until something terrible is about to hap-
pen, or has already happened.
Kaye describes the years of watching the onset of her teenage son's
schizophrenia, waiting until he was "sick enough" to be hospitalized:
The sergeant arrived about ten minutes later. He listened
to the tape and said, "[1]et's get this kid to City Hospital."
They called for an ambulance. Since Ben had been quietly
cooperative with Officer Weir and had agreed to the trip to
the hospital "to confer with a different doctor about the med-
ications" he had been taking, there was no need to bring him
into the hospital in handcuffs. I was grateful for that much. .
At the hospital, Ben went quietly inside with the admit-
ting nurse. A few hours later, at 1 a.m., a nurse allowed me
into the room to see him. I sat with Ben for another hour
while we waited for the doctor. Ben was generally quiet and
sullen, but every so often he spoke to me.
Sara Gordon, The Danger Zone: How the Dangerousness Standard in Civil Commitment
Proceedings Harms People with Serious Mental Illness, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 657, 669-
71 (2016) (footnotes omitted).
"I See Brakel & Davis, supra note 89, at 536-37, 542.
146 See Player, supra note 86, at 187.
147 See Brakel & Davis, supra note 89, at 518; Player, supra note 86, at 201-02.
148 Player, supra note 86, at 202 ("[C]ommitments to autonomy and personal sovereignty
limit the power of governments to prevent citizens from harming no one other than them-
selves.").
[Vol. 43168
Memoir as Witness to Mental Illness 169
"Mom, you know I have a special gift. I can see wavy
lines coming out of certain objects. Everything has an en-
ergy. I can see it. Most people can't." . . .
I had to be at work at the radio station in two and a
half hours. I went into the treatment room, kissed my sleep-
ing son, and went back home for whatever sleep I could get.
It would have to do. I made it through our morning radio
show on automatic pilot. I was also in a state of heightened
alert. Please admit Ben to the psychiatric floor. He needs to
be observed. He needs so much more help than I can give
him. Please.
At 10 a.m. I got the call from a hospital nurse. "You can
come and pick up your son," she said.
"What? No. You can't. He has to be admitted," I said.
"I'm sorry," said the nurse. "He had a good night's sleep,
and he keeps telling us that he's fine now. He seems all right.
We can't keep him here against his will. He's over eighteen,
and we don't have an order for involuntary commitment
from his psychiatrist."
There was no way out. I reluctantly picked Ben up from
the hospital to start the cycle again....
Things got worse after that. In addition to the mood
swings, Ben continued to become more and more isolated.
He turned away from people and toward the written word.
He couldn't go to a restaurant or a movie without his pens
and paper, a spiral notebook or scraps from his pocket. He
wrote things down during conversations. He wrote during
television shows. He could not stop writing. He was retreat-
ing into what he called his poetry. When he showed it to me,
all I could see were symbols and scribbling....
For the next six months, I watched and waited. It was
more of the same. He dropped all of his classes except for
Poetry 1.01, which he barely passed. He lost jobs soon after
he landed them. He got four traffic tickets and missed the
court dates. His car was filled with old food, papers, garbage,
but never enough gas or oil. Eventually it died an oil-de-
prived death, and Ben abandoned it at a local gas station. He
owed money all over town; he had bounced checks one after
the other, some for as little as five dollars. . ..
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The pile of things lost from his life got bigger, his sense
of pride and accomplishment got smaller, and his delusions
got grander.
"It doesn't matter," he said. "I like solitude, anyway. Un-
less I can be with people who are as deep as I am, who delve
into their consciousness like I do, I'd rather just write po-
etry.".
For fifteen months I had waited for the chance to get Ben
some more consistent help, more thorough observation of his
symptoms, monitoring of his recovery. That could only hap-
pen in a twenty-four-hour facility-a hospital setting, a psy-
chiatric facility. Everyone kept telling me that their hands
were tied. Ben wasn't "sick enough."
Not sick enough? What is "sick enough"? Threatening
someone? Disturbing the peace? Causing a scene so embar-
rassing that he'd never want to show his face in Trumbull
again? What does it take to get the kind of attention that
might actually do some good?
If I couldn't make him well, did I have to let him get
sicker to get better? So the two possible options, success and
dismal failure, could at least get us out of the useless cycle
we were in. We began the search for an apartment for Ben. .
Four weeks. That's all it took from moving day to Ben's
first hospitalization for mental illness.
On the way to the hospital, I tried to say as little as pos-
sible, to avoid saying the wrong thing. Would Ben stay in
the car or try to get out? What was he thinking? The fifteen
minutes to the hospital ticked away way too slowly. Ben was
pretty quiet. He stared straight ahead for a while. Once he
turned to me and said, "Don't look at me like that, Mom!"
"Like what, Ben?"
"Like you think I'm evil or something. I know what
you're thinking."....
... If I hadn't known better, I would have thought I was
talking to someone on LSD or falling down drunk. But he
wasn't either of those things. . ..
[Vol. 43170
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The admitting nurse had a list of questions to ask me.
She began with "Has your son threatened to hurt himself?
Any talk of suicide?"
"No," I admitted.
She went down the list. "Has he threatened you in any
way?"
"No, not really." Another "no" checked off on the form.
"Is he a danger to himself or to others? Is he capable of
taking care of himself?"
Oh, please, don't turn him away. Not now. Then I re-
membered the stove.
"Well, last time he was in his apartment, he left the stove
on. He could have started a fire," I said.
That did it. The nurse checked off a "yes" at last. Ben
had finally made it to "sick enough." He was a danger to
himself ....
... I went home, knowing for the first time in months that
nothing bad could happen to Ben while I was away from
him. 149
Earley describes taking his son to the emergency room, only to have
him released and commit a crime a few days later:
The [emergency room] doctor said, "Virginia law is very
specific. Unless a patient is in imminent danger to himself or
others, I cannot treat him unless he voluntarily agrees to be
treated." Before I could reply, he asked Mike, "Will you take
medicines if I offer them to you?"
"No, I don't believe in your poisons," Mike said. "Can I
leave now?"
"Yes," the doctor answered without consulting me. Mike
jumped off the patient's table and hurried out the door. I
started after him, but stopped and decided to try one last time
to reason with the doctor.
"My son's bipolar, he's off his meds, he has a history of
psychotic behavior. You've got to do something! He's sick!
Help him, please!"
149 KAYE, supra note 100, at 150-74.
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He said, "Your son is an adult, and while he is clearly
acting odd, he has a right under the law to refuse treatment."
It was 2 p.m. now, and during the past twenty-four hours
I'd watched Mike slip deeper and deeper into his own delu-
sional world. Because it was his mind that was sick, I was
being told that I had to back off and leave him to face his
madness alone. I had to watch as he gradually continued to
lose all touch with reality.
This can't get any worse, I thought.
But I soon discovered it could....
The next morning I was awakened by a call from the
Fairfax police.
Mike was being driven to the Woodburn Center for
Community Mental Health. It was less than one mile from
the Inova Fairfax Hospital emergency room where I'd taken
him Friday night, begging for help. The dispatcher wouldn't
tell me why he had been arrested.
A tall, thin uniformed officer was waiting outside when
I pulled up to the center. Police Officer Vern Albert said
Mike had gotten up early at his mother's house and had
walked to a nearby Starbucks coffee shop. He'd removed a
glass water bottle from a shelf there, hoisted it up into the
air, and announced to the store's customers that it wouldn't
break if he dropped it because he had supernatural powers.
He had let the bottle fall, and it had shattered at his feet. Mike
had bolted from the store. But a clerk had recognized him
from their high school days together and telephoned the po-
lice. While Officer Albert and his partner were interviewing
her, they received a call from their dispatcher. A burglar
alarm had gone off a few blocks away.
It was Mike. From Starbucks, he'd run into a residential
area, entered the backyard of a house, climbed onto its
wooden deck, and hurled a patio chair through the plate-
glass door, setting off the alarm.
"Luckily, the homeowners were away for the long holi-
day weekend," Officer Albert said.
Ignoring the piercing sound, Mike had ducked inside the
house, switched on a stereo CD player to drown out the
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racket, and begun rummaging through the kitchen cabinets.
He'd then made his way upstairs, where he'd gone from
bathroom to bathroom, turning on the taps. After checking
the bedrooms and discovering no one was around, Mike had
stripped and taken a bubble bath....
A few days later the phone rang and I checked the caller
ID. It was the Fairfax County police. As I reached for it, I
noticed my hand was trembling.
"Mr. Earley," a woman said, "I'm detective V.0. Armel
of the Reston substation. I'm calling to tell you two felony
warrants have been issued for your son's arrest."
I didn't understand. "Is he okay?" I asked. "What's he
done?"
"These charges are from the home break-in," Detective
Armel explained. Mike was being charged with violating
Virginia Sec. 18.2-137 (intentionally destroying, defacing,
and damaging property in excess of $100) and Sec. 18.2-91
(breaking and entering in the daytime with the intent to com-
mit larceny). Both carried up to $10,000 in fines, as well as
five-year prison sentences.
Prison. Five years.i'
These accounts illustrate that there is a cost to allowing someone to
refuse treatment for psychotic symptoms, a cost that is important to under-
stand when deciding when someone should be forced to take antipsychotic
medications. Of course, it is still possible to decide, either as a general rule
or in a particular case, that the harms of involuntary treatment outweigh the
harms of untreated psychosis, but that decision cannot properly be made
without an understanding of the costs of both options.
IV. CONCLUSION
On the basis their own personal life experiences, most of us can im-
age what it might feel like to be subjected to civil commitment or involuntary
treatment. No one wants to be confined to a locked hospital ward unable to
leave or forced to take medications over your own objections. On the other
hand, many of us-those who have not experienced the symptoms of psy-
150 EARLEY, supra note 97, at 15-32.
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chosis or interacted directly with someone who is experiencing such symp-
toms-cannot imagine what untreated psychosis might feel like. We cannot
imagine what our lives would be like if we believed things that 
everyone else
understood to be false. This lack of understanding of what it feels like to
experience psychotic symptoms can hinder the formulation 
of appropriate
legal rules regarding civil commitment and involuntary treatment, 
as well as
the insanity defense. This article has proposed that memoirs of mental illness
are one way to increase knowledge of what it feels like to experience un-
treated psychosis. This knowledge is essential to formulating legal rules that
will determine when people with serious mental illnesses can be detained,
administered medications against their will, or held criminally responsible
for their conduct.
